Bowles also conveyed Kennedy's resolve to the Soviet ambassador at a meeting between the two men on October 13. 8 The Soviets gave every indication of sensitivity both to American strategic interests and to the president's political needs. In their September 4 meeting, Ambassador Dobrynin called on Robert Kennedy to relay a confidential promise from Chairman Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would not create any trouble for the United States during the election campaign.9 Dobrynin read the actual message aloud to Sorensen two days later. To Sorensen's rejoinder that Soviet buildup in Cuba had already aggravated world and domestic tensions, Dobrynin replied that he would report this conversation in full to the chairman and that he was aware himself of the political and press excitement regarding this matter ... he repeated several times ... that they had done nothing new or extraordinary in Cuba-that the events causing all the excitement had been taking place somewhat gradually and quietly over a long period of time -and that he stood by his assurances that all these steps were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States. 10 On September 11, the Soviet government issued an official statement in response to Kennedy's warnings. While not specifically promising to abstain from introducing surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba -something that would have appeared an act of abject submission -the statement communicated this intent by denying that there was any need for the Soviet Union to shift its retaliatory weapons to Cuba in order to defend it." l Shortly thereafter, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet official in Washington used by Khrushchev as his personal courier to the White House, conveyed a message directly from Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoian. They assured Kennedy that "no missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba."''2 On October 13, Dobrynin reiterated the Soviet position. He denied emphatically to Chester Bowles that his government had any intention of putting such missiles into Cuba. I I The Soviet statements, both public and private, appeared to indicate Soviet recognition of the nature and the gravity of the American warning. They can only be interpreted as assurances to Kennedy that Moscow understood and respected American strategic and political interests in Cuba. Graham Allison 8 Abel, Missile Crisis, 50. 9 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 24-26. 10 Sorensen, Kennedy, 667-68. has offered the judgment that both parties acted according to the rules of responsible diplomacy. He wrote:
The United States formulated a policy stating precisely "what strategic transformations we prepared to resist." The Soviet Union acknowledged these vital interests and announced a strategy that entailed no basic conflict. This would also seem to be a model case of communication, or signalling, between the superpowers. By private messages and public statements, the United States committed itself to action should the Soviets cross an unambiguous line (by placing offensive missiles in Cuba). All responses indicated that the Soviets understood the signal and accepted the message.14 In retrospect, it is evident that Moscow had decided sometime in June to put missiles in Cuba. Their assurances to the contrary were designed to lull the Kennedy administration into inaction until the missiles were actually deployed. How could Soviet leaders have embarked upon such a course of action when it was almost certain to provoke a major confrontation with the United States whether or not the missiles were discovered before they became operational? More troubling still, why did Moscow continue to proceed with its strategic ruse even after Kennedy's several warnings, stepped-up American surveillance, and well-advertised military preparations clearly indicated that such a confrontation was a near certainty?
THE ANALYSTS COME TO KHRUSHCHEV's RESCUE
A bewildering array of hypotheses has attempted to explain Soviet policy in the Cuban missile crisis. Remarkably, practically all of these explanations start with the premise that Khruschev behaved rationally. Simple deductive logic suggests four generic explanations for Soviet policy that are congruent with rational decision-making. These assume that the gains justified the risks; that the gains justified the costs; that Khrushchev was deliberately misled by Kennedy; and that Khrushchev was inadvertently misled by Kennedy. Each of these explanations has in fact been advanced by at least one student of the crisis.'5
Gains that Justify the Risks
According to this explanation, Khrushchev and the inner circle of Soviet policymakers fully realized the probability that their missiles in Cuba, if discovered, would provoke a crisis with the United States. They accepted this risk because they expected to reap considerable political and strategic gains if the missiles were not detected until they became operational. Adam Ulam, who adopted this viewpoint, has conjured up a possible payoff. 61 He argues that Soviet leaders in the spring of 1962 "were seized with an irresistible desire" to solve the most grueling dilemmas of Soviet foreign policy. The introduction of nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba was a "bold stroke" to resolve all at once the German problem, the China problem, and the difficulties associated with Soviet strategic inferiority. Ulam described how this was to be done:
Once in Cuba, the missiles would become negotiable, their removal conditional upon the United States meeting Soviet conditions on the German peace treaty and other pressing international issues. Appearing in New York in November, Khrushchev would present to the world a dramatic package deal resolving the world's most momentous problems: the German peace treaty, containing an absolute prohibition against nuclear weapons for Bonn; and a similar proposal in reference to the Far East, where the Soviets would demand a nuclear free zone in the Pacific and, under this guise, extract a pledge from China not to manufacture atomic weapons....
In addition, part of the price the Americans would pay for the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba could well be the withdrawal of their protection from Formosa. This would add an almost irresistible incentive for the Chinese at least to postpone their atomic ambitions. 1 7
As Ulam acknowledged, Soviet expectations that Peking could be induced not to manufacture nuclear weapons were not altogether realistic. He speculated, however, that Moscow counted not only on the Formosa concession but on the general "atmosphere" created by their proposal to bring the Chinese around. He further reasoned that Khrushchev "must have thought" the Americans would actually be grateful to him because his gambit would resolve the German problem, remove the threatening prospect of China having nuclear weapons, and establish the political preconditions for a far-reaching Soviet-American disarmament treaty. Admittedly, the entire scheme rested on the ability of the Soviets to install their missiles in Cuba without the missiles being detected by the Americans. This was a reasonable risk, according to Ulam, because even if the Americans found out about the weapons, they probably would not respond with a nuclear strike. ' 18 Ibid. Ulam argues that "of course there was bound to be a wild wave of excitement and indignation in the United States at the revelation that sixty-four atomic missiles were pointed at the United States from Cuba, but since Khrushchev thought that he would make this revelation, he also believed its effect would immediately be countered by his simultaneous generous and far-reaching proposals, for accession to which he would remove the deadly weapons" (p. 669).
tive. To sustain the thesis that expected gains balanced expected risks, he must postulate a potpourri of incentives that strain the reader's credulity, with regard both to their realism and to the likelihood that Soviet leaders would consider them as a coordinated package. Ulam claims -probably correctly -that "no other explanation . . . accounts for the risks undertaken by the Soviets at that precise moment."'9 For this very reason one must question the fundamental assumption on which his entire argument rests.
Gains that Justify the Costs
The Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba could also be considered rational if Moscow acted in full knowledge or expectation of the consequences. This would mean that the actual outcome of the crisis more or less represented the objective that Moscow sought from the outset. Khrushchev himself advanced this claim. He insisted his government had information that the United States was preparing another assault on Cuba and sent in missiles in order to extract a no-invasion pledge from President Kennedy. "We shipped our weapons to Cuba," Khrushchev wrote afterwards, "precisely for the prevention of aggression against her! That is why the Soviet government reaffirmed its agreement to the removal of the ballistic rockets from Cuba."20 Khrushchev also denied that this aim-represented an ad hoc improvisation. Rather, he alleged, it was a policy that was "from the outset, worked out in the collective leadership."'2' At least two Western analysts have accepted Khrushchev's explanation at face value. One, Edward Crankshaw, wrote in his preface to Khrushchev's chapter on the Cuban confrontation:
It was clear at a very early date to most sensitive observers that Khrushchev's motives were more or less precisely as he describes them. In the West too much was made (though not by President Kennedy) of his humiliation in being forced to withdraw his missiles. The Chinese exploited this up to the hilt, and so did Khrushchev's adversaries at home. The fact remains that he achieved what he set out to do, though not quite in the manner he intended: he secured Castro's Cuba from the standing threat of invasion. And he achieved an understanding with President Kennedy, whose assassination was for him a profound and very personal misfortune.22
Most students of the crisis have dismissed Khrushchev's description of Soviet motivations as an unconvincing but understandable effort on his part to save ' There is another hypothesis to consider. If Kennedy's age bothered Khrushchev, it may have been for the opposite reason. Rightly or wrongly, the young are notorious for their rashness and willingness to take risks that their elders might abjure. Khrushchev might have viewed a young president as less predictable, less compromising, and overly concerned with proving his virility and making a reputation for himself.33 Charles de Gaulle levelled such a charge at Kennedy. While officially supporting the president during the crisis, the French leader hinted that immaturity had led him to overreact to the presence of Soviet mfissiles in Cuba.34 Khrushchev himself seemed concerned that Kennedy would underestimate him because of his advanced age. Arthur Schlesinger reported that the Soviet leader confided to Kennedy over lunch in Vienna that "he envied the President his youth ... if he were as young, he would be devoting even more energy to the cause but at the age of sixty-seven he was still not renouncing the competition."35 This comment, Schlesinger noted, was made at a relatively unguarded moment during an otherwise tense summit meeting when the Soviet leader was "rambling on." As such, the comment seems at least as convincing a revelation of Khrushchev's feelings as the report that Abel cited, a report moreover, that equally supports this interpretation.
As for the Vienna meeting, the story that Khrushchev took Kennedy's measure and found him wanting originated with James Reston of the New York Times. Reston had the opportunity to observe Kennedy ten minutes after his final session with Khrushchev. Three and a half years later, he described his recollection of this encounter. Kennedy intimates reported that the president's somber state of mind was the result of his concern that the deadlock in Vienna meant a "cold winter" in Berlin and elsewhere. Be that as it may, they and Khrushchev are still in complete agreement that Kennedy, although taken aback by Khrushchev's vehemence, parried the chairman's verbal thrusts with skill and conviction and conveyed the impression of being a firm but thoughtful leader.
The third and most common charge raised against Kennedy is that his refusal to commit American troops to the faltering Bay of Pigs invasion undermined his credibility in Khrushchev's eyes. Henry H. Pachter asserted that this "compromised America's good-will abroad and . . . discredited her will power." As the seriousness of Kennedy's purpose became suspect, "the credibility of the American deterrent was jeopardized. By all accounts, the political dimension of Cuba stiffened Kennedy's resolve both before and after the discovery of the missiles. Sorensen commented: "Once he had taken his stand on this issue, his public pledge to act thereafter was irrevocable."50 Robert Kennedy offered a revealing vignette to this effect. During the blockade, he reported, his brother asked him why they were risking war with the Soviet Union. "I just don't think there was any choice," he replied, "and not only that, if you hadn't you would have been impeached." "That's what I think," the president agreed, "I would have been impeached."'"
The real question here is not Kennedy's resolve but the extent to which the Soviet leadership was sensitive to the president's domestic political problem and how it was almost certain to stiffen his resolve on any question having to do 46 Marxist theory would suggest not, since it minimizes the role of the individual in history and stresses instead the decisive influence of class. Class differences, not personal idiosyncracies or free will, are said to determine political differences among policymakers. Leaders from the same class background can be expected to behave in more or less the same way. To the extent that the world views of Khrushchev and his colleagues were conditioned by Marxism, they would have analyzed foreign policy-including the question of an adversary's resolve-from quite different perspectives than their American counterparts.
Khrushchev gave every indication of having such a Marxist orientation. Twice in his chapter on the Vienna summit he noted with apparent amusement the tendency of the bourgeois press "to play up personalities" and to explain foreign policy in terms of them.6' Too much, of course, can be made of the operational distinctions between the Marxist and liberal analysis of foreign policy formulation. Khrushchev was not so much an ideologue to ignore the differences among American leaders, nor are Western analysts altogether insensitive to the influence of impersonal economic and social forces on a leader's policies. But it would be fatuous to deny that these different perspectives do exist and have affected the ways Soviet and American policymakers view the world. By attempting to explain Soviet miscalculations in Cuba almost entirely in terms of their judgment of John Kennedy's character, many American analysts reveal a certain cognitive innocence. They can fairly be charged with projecting their own cultural bias onto the Soviets and of interpreting Soviet policy in terms of it.
Attention to the impression that Kennedy as an individual made on Khrushchev appears to derive from another source, one that has more disturbing implications. James Reston and Elie Abel, the two commentators primarily responsible for focusing analytical attention on Kennedy's youth, his performance in Vienna, and his handling of the Bay of Pigs operation, did not conceive this emphasis on their own. They were put on this track by Kennedy himself. At a book and author lunch, Abel recounted the story of visiting the president in observation by de Gaulle that the United States, never having lived with direct threats to its security, overreacted to the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba. The implicit argument here is that Khrushchev, as a European, failed to realize American sensitivity on this point. 61 Khrushchev believed that the American people were too timid to risk nuclear war and too concerned with legalisms to justify any distinction between our overseas missile bases and his-that once we were actually confronted with the missiles we would do nothing but protest-that we would thereby appear weak and irresolute to the world, causing our allies to doubt our word and to seek accommodations with the Soviets, and permitting increased communist sway in Latin America in particular.64
Kennedy himself told the American people in his television address that the missiles in Cuba represented a challenge that had to be answered "if our courage and commitments are ever to be trusted again by friend or foe."65 Barton Bernstein, who has studied the most recently declassified materials on the crisis, has confirmed that for most of Kennedy's advisers the "courage and commitment" thesis remained the most convincing explanation of Soviet behavior. 66 The All the theories about Soviet policy examined here maintain that Soviet leaders behaved rationally. In other words, they acted in accord with either Soviet national interests, their own political interests, or a combination of the two. Starting from this premise, they elaborate one of four generic explanations congruent with this assumption to explain why Khrushchev and those around him accepted the risks associated with introducing Soviet missiles into Cuba. None of these explanations is particularly convincing. Their failure is certainly not attributable to any lack of imagination or diligence on the part of the analysts; indeed both characteristics typify so many of their efforts to reconstruct a rationale for Khrushchev's behavior. The problem lies instead with the assumption of rationality, which simply cannot be reconciled with Khrushchev's policy.
An alternative explanation should accordingly be based upon the assumption that Khrushchev had no plausible reasons for questioning Kennedy's commitment to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba. Such an approach immediately suggests a different line of analysis. Instead of trying to explain away the credibility of Kennedy's carefully worded warnings, the principal stumbling block of the explanations discussed here, an alternative explanation should show why and how Khrushchev convinced himself in the face of all the indications to the contrary that he could successfully put Soviet missiles into Cuba. This is also a formidable analytical obstacle, but one that may prove less difficult to overcome.
The present author's comparative research into international crises suggests a hypothesis that might clarify the mystery of Soviet policy in the Cuban missile crisis.75 The origins of thirteen "brinkmanship" crises -confrontations in which a state challenges an important commitment of an adversary in the expectation that the adversary will back down-were studied to determine why policymakers pursued policies that risked war. The finding was that almost without exception, these crises could most readily be traced to grave foreign and domestic threats that leaders believed could only be overcome through an aggressive foreign policy.
The most important external threat was the expectation of a dramatic shift in the balance of power. In seven of the thirteen cases, brinkmanship was preceded by the widely shared perception among policymakers that a dramatic, unfavorable shift in the balance of power was imminent.76 Brinkmanship in these cases was conceived as a forceful response to acute and impending danger, as a means of preventing or even redressing the shift in the balance of power before time ran out and such a response became unrealistic. A second motivation for an aggressive foreign policy derived from the weakness of a state's political system. In four of the cases -Korea (1903-4), Bosnia (1908-9), July (1914), and Arab-Israeli (1967)-domestic political instability or the frangibility of the state itself appeared instrumental in convincing leaders to provoke a confrontation. They resorted to the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad.
The political weakness of leaders as distinct from the instability of the political system as a whole provided a third incentive for brinkmanship, as individual leaders sought success abroad in order to buttress their domestic positions. Political weakness can also lead to confrontations because leaders feel too insecure to oppose policies they know to be highly risky or otherwise ill-conceived. One or the other of these manifestations of political weakness appears to have played a role in the origins of ten of the brinkmanship challenges.77
A fourth incentive for brinkmanship is associated with intraelite competition for power. This was a primary cause of three brinkmanship crisis and probably a secondary cause of several others. A bureaucratic subunit or political coalition can engineer a confrontation with a foreign power in the expectation that it will enhance its domestic influence or undermine those of its adversaries. Intraelite competition can also induce actors to pursue policies calculated to advance their domestic interests even though these policies have the side effect of provoking a crisis with another state. The Fashoda crisis (1898) is an example of the former and the Russo-Japanese crisis in Korea (1903-4) of the latter.
In practice, the expectation that an adversary would back down when challenged has often proved unwarranted. The cases revealed that most brinkmanship challenges were initiated without any good evidence that the adversaries in question lacked the resolve to defend their commitment; on the contrary, available indications most often pointed to the opposite conclusion. The commitments at stake appeared to have met the four conditions normally associated with successful deterrence: they were clearly defined; their existence was communicated to possible adversaries; the states making them possessed the means to defend them; and these states made reasonable efforts to demonstrate their resolve to do so. In only five cases-First Morocco (1903-4), Bosnia (1905-6), Rhineland (1936), Munich (1938), and Berlin (1948)-did the leaders of the state challenging a commitment have compelling reasons to suspect that their adversaries would back down. Even so, in two of these cases states had to drop their challenge because of the opposition they encountered. In every other case, the initiators had to back down or face war.
These findings indicate that a vulnerable commitment is not a precondition for brinkmanship. What counts is the initiator's perception -often faulty -that a vulnerable commitment exists. The cases also suggested the hypothesis that such poor judgment was related to the perceived need to pursue a brinkmanship challenge. When policymakers became convinced of the necessity of achieving specific foreign policy objectives, they became predisposed to see these objectives as attainable.
The study documented this assertion in the July (1914), Korea (1950), and Sino-Indian (1962) crises. In all three confrontations, political leaders felt compelled to pursue aggressive foreign policies in response to strategic and domestic political imperatives. They convinced themselves that they could achieve their objectives without provoking war. Because they knew the extent to which they were powerless to back down, they expected that their adversaries would have to do so. Some leaders also took comfort in the illusion that they would emerge victorious at little cost to themselves if war developed.
German, American, and Indian policymakers maintained these beliefs, despite much evidence to the contrary both before and during the crisis. They resorted to elaborate personal and institutional defenses to avoid coming to terms with this information. The most prevalent defense mechanism was denial. Kaiser Wilhelm II and those around him used denial to discredit reports that Britain would intervene in a continental war. Dean Acheson, Jawaharlal Nehru, and their respective advisers resorted to denial to discount the possibility that their policies would provoke Chinese military responses. On an institutional level, denial took the form of structuring feedback channels to filter out dissonant information and to reinforce the preconceived notions of political leaders. In such a closed environment, events did little to disabuse policymakers of their unrealistic expectations. These cases point to the pessimistic hypothesis that policymakers with the greatest need to learn from external reality are the least likely to do so.
The Cuban missile crisis appears to conform, at least in part, to this pattern. By all American accounts, Soviet leaders had strong -even compelling -incentives to put missiles into Cuba. The most widely accepted interpretations of their action attributed Soviet policymakers' action to their need to redress the strategic balance.78 As is well known, the Kennedy administration decided in the autumn of 1961 to tell the Soviets that it knew that their first-generation ICBM had proven a failure. This was done in the hope of moderating Khrushchev's bellicosity over Berlin. However, it put the Soviets on notice that the United States, through its satellite reconnaissance, realized the full extent of Soviet vulnerability to a first strike. Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba are therefore said by many analysts to have been conceived of as a "quick fix" to compensate in the short term for Soviet strategic inferiority.
The other cases of brinkmanship revealed a multiplicity of motives on the part of the initiator. Collectively, these cases held out the promise of sufficient rewards to make policymakers more willing to run whatever risks involved with 78 The assumption of rationality on Khrushchev's part is all the more puzzling given the prevailing assessment of Khrushchev's personality. No major author has suggested that Khrushchev was a prudent man. He was attracted to grand gestures and acted impulsively. He gambled, often with little apparent chance of success. Cuba fits perfectly with this pattern of behavior. It should be seen in the same light as his bluff about the potency of Soviet strategic forces, his Berlin challenges, and his virgin lands program. Along with Cuba, these initia-tives were probably the "harebrained schemes" that his politburo colleagues referred to at the time of his dismissal. Western analysts are therefore in the odd position of defending the behavior of a Soviet leader, a man who the Soviets themselves ridicule for his lack of judgment.
What accounts for this compulsion to portray Soviet policy as rational? Philosophers of science have observed that scientists tend to fit data into existing frameworks even if the framework does not do justice to the facts. Investigators deduce evidence in support of theory. Theory, once accepted, determines to which facts they pay attention. According to Thomas Kuhn, the several fields of science are each dominated by a "paradigm," an accepted body of related concepts that establishes the framework for research.84 The paradigm determines the phenomena that are important and what kinds of explanations "make sense." It also dictates the kinds of facts and explanations that are to be ignored because they are outside the paradigm or not relevant to the problems the paradigm has defined as important. Paradigms condition investigators to reject evidence that contradicts their expectations, to misunderstand it, to twist its meaning to make it consistent, to explain it away, to deny it, or simply to ignore it.
Since 1950, deterrence theory has been widely accepted by political scientists. In a 1979 article on the subject, Robert Jervis called it "probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations."85 Put simply, deterrence consists of manipulating other actors' assessment of their interests and seeks to prevent a specified action by convincing the actor who might contemplate it that its costs exceed its rewards. Individuals or states who employ deterrence identify their interests and commit themselves to their defense. By demonstrating their ability and willingness to do so, they attempt to convince others that it is not in their interests to challenge these commitments. When these efforts succeed, the commitments in question are said to be credible.
Deterrence theory is based on the premise that policymakers behave in terms of a rational calculus that maximizes payoffs and minimizes costs. It therefore assumes that credible commitments will not be challenged unless an adversary does so deliberately to provoke a conflict. When deterrence "fails," analysts do not blame the theory, but the policymakers who attempted to implement itsomehow they did not succeed in imparting sufficient credibility to their commitment. Perhaps this explains what has happened with regard to the Cuban missile crisis. Analysts, working within the dominant paradigm, have gone to great lengths to make the case consistent with the theory. There is another explanation worth considering for this phenomenon. Deterrence is the major intellectual and policy bulwark against nuclear war. It is based on the comforting assumption that nuclear adversaries are so horrified by the devastating consequences of nuclear war that they will behave prudently toward one another. For this reason, the definition and communication of truly vital commitments can be expected to function as a reasonably efficacious strategy of conflict avoidance. To recognize that the one acute thermonuclear crisis to date was brought about by the irresponsible and irrational judgments of the leader of a nuclear superpower-perhaps by the entire inner circle of its foreign policymaking elite-would call into question the most fundamental assumption of deterrence. It may be that this is why so many investigators have sought to lay the onus for Khrushchev's miscalculation at Kennedy's feet by arguing that Kennedy's actions undercut the credibility of his commitment. By doing so, analysts have attempted to preserve intact the theory of deterrence and with it their emotional composure.
The way in which students of the crisis have exaggerated Kennedy's skill in managing the crisis offers some corroboration of the suspicion that Cuba has been used to shore up emotional defenses against nuclear war. As this author has tried to demonstrate elsewhere, analysts have studiously ignored the "group think" and other deviations from "open decision-making" that in fact characterized Kennedy's management of that confrontation. Their interpretations are reassuring because they imply that leaders can still act cooly and skillfully when subjected to the kind of stress generated by a nuclear crisis.86
One of the first serious analyses of the Cuban missile crisis was Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter's Controlling the Risks in Cuba, published in 1965.87 In this landmark study, the Wohlstetters contended that Khrushchev's and Kennedy's performance provided a stunning counterexample to the pessimistic predictions of nuclear holocaust made by so many behavioral scientists up to that time. They also propagated the view that the crisis had come about because of miscalculations that were both understandable and correctable. The real problem, the Wohlstetters insisted, was that "each side in short tended to project its own psychology or certain stereotypes about the behavior of the other."88 The review of the literature here suggests that this is even truer of the analysts; their interpretations of the crisis tell us at least as much about themselves as they do about Khrushchev and Kennedy. The Cuban missile crisis might be likened to a Rorschach test: the ink blots that constitute the few facts reveal little that is conclusive about Soviet policymaking, but the responses of political scientists to them say a lot about their anxiety concerning nuclear war. Unfortunately, the attempt by the analysts to deny the strong strain of irrationality that runs through even the most momentous policy decisions will not make such a war any less likely. 
